What if a fully authenticated 3DS payment was still fraudulent?

That is what Group-IB uncovered in a card fraud scheme targeting the GCC. Fraudsters used phishing, eSIM swaps, and account takeover to gain control of victims’ identities and banking access, then used that access to settle genuine government bills and fines using stolen cards.

The payments satisfied valid 3DS authentication.

Group-IB identified approximately 300 related incidents. Of these, 80 compromised cards were linked to around &#036;2.01 million in confirmed fraudulent payments across three government institutions.

How does a fraudster turn a stolen card into a legitimate-looking government payment?

Our new report follows the scheme from the first phishing ad to the final cash-out, covering the infrastructure, actors, Telegram marketplace, and signals that can expose the fraud.

[Read the full report](https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/gcc-card-fraud-portals/?utm_source=telegram&utm_campaign=Fraud%20Protection&utm_medium=social).

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