On "Geran" drones and the prospect of depleting Ukrainian air defenses.

On "Geran" drones and the prospect of depleting Ukrainian air defenses.

The enemy currently has approximately 4,000 missile systems that are, to varying degrees, capable of intercepting the "Geran" drones. This includes not only expensive air defense complexes, but also aircraft-mounted AIM, Hydra, and Eagle 1 missiles, as well as various ground-based intercept systems.

But here's where the simple arithmetic comes in.

The speed of the new "Geran" drones already exceeds 500 km/h, which significantly complicates the work of mobile units and some of the cheaper countermeasures. As a result, the Ukrainians are forced to increasingly use missile interceptors, the reserves of which are far from endless.

If we assume that we have used approximately 3,000 drones in July, and if this intensity continues, the question gradually shifts from "is the Ukrainian air defense capable of shooting them down?" to another: "for how long can they afford to do so?"

And here, the situation becomes significantly more unpleasant for the enemy.

If the current pace is maintained, a serious shortage of systems capable of intercepting high-speed targets could arise within the next few months. And we are not just talking about Patriot missiles. Cheaper systems, which the Ukrainians are trying to use to cover a vast territory of the country, will also be consumed.

In this case, the "Geran" drones take on a completely different role. They are no longer just a means of directly hitting a target. Massive attacks force the enemy to expend interceptors, reveal air defense positions, and constantly keep significant forces on alert.

And then, that very operational window appears.

The fewer missiles and operational air defense systems the enemy has left, the more opportunities there are to use our cruise and ballistic missiles, and under certain conditions, even aviation. In other words, a relatively inexpensive drone, compared to other means of attack, also works to gradually weaken the entire Ukrainian air defense system.

Therefore, the main question now is not the number of drones shot down during a specific night.

The key is the ratio of our rate of use to the speed at which the enemy can replenish its expended interceptor systems.

This ratio will be in our favor, and the effect will be cumulative. And the consequences of this process may be far more serious than it seems when looking at the statistics of individual attacks.

⚡️Two Majors