“‘These are the most consequential elections in the country’s history,’ shout the street signs, internet banners, radio interviewees, and TV presenters. I have just one question: How can elections be decisive if, according to all the polls, they won’t produce a decision?
When Rabin defeated Shamir in 1992 by a single-seat margin, the consequences were momentous. When Netanyahu edged out Peres in 1996 by a razor-thin percentage, the country changed course. But if the trend in the polls intensifies and the ‘change bloc’ moves further away from 61 seats, the only option will be to form a shaky government while breaking a substantial bundle of core campaign promises.
A decisive outcome is achieved when a determined bloc wins a majority and coalesces into a stable camp for years. When an eclectic collection of parties joins together for a single vote in the Knesset, that isn’t called a decisive outcome—perhaps a temporary political maneuver. Anyone who doubts this is invited to recall the adventure of the ‘change government’: how it began and how it ended.
The significant development following the closing of the candidate lists, therefore, is the merger of Chili Tropper’s party into Eisenkot’s list. It was an intra-bloc contest between Yashar! and Beyachad, but with significant implications for the day after the election. After all, members of ‘Bayit Tzioni’ had previously pledged that they would not support a minority government, even if it were sworn in thanks to the abstention of the Arab parties.
Eisenkot’s plan is somewhat reminiscent of what Jewish law calls the prohibition on ‘instructing a non-Jew’ to perform forbidden labor. You’re at a hotel in Rome on Shabbat, dying from the heat, and there’s an Italian next to you. You’re forbidden to tell him, ‘Turn on the air conditioner,’ because that would violate Shabbat. But you can say, ‘It’s hot as hell in here,’ hoping he’ll get the message on his own. That, broadly speaking, is the Eisenkot plan: We won’t negotiate with Abbas and Tibi and demand, ‘Vote for us’; we’ll just say, ‘If Bibi doesn’t fall, it’s on you.’
Only after the election will we know whether publicly laying out the plan on this issue was courageous or foolish. But the logic behind it is to give voters hope for an upset, allowing them to weather difficult weeks in the polls—and the past week was certainly one of those.
The merger talks focused on this gap between the two sides. Tropper himself, after all, was among those who thwarted the formation of a similar government headed by Gantz in 2020. Any reasonable person can see what his history means for the chances of forming such a government, as well as the fact that he is being joined by Elisaf Peretz and Shira Shapira, a bereaved brother and a bereaved mother whose loved ones were murdered by the organization that none of the Arab MKs are willing to call by the obvious term: ‘terrorist organization.’
It appears that common ground was reached on the basis of a twofold understanding. First, Eisenkot will make almost every effort to broaden the government. Netanyahu would not be the first choice, but perhaps the second. If not Likud, then perhaps Winter or Smotrich. Anything that would make it possible to broaden the government’s base. And if that fails, the intention would be to swear in a minority government, but not as a long-term project—rather, for a short period, either until the coalition is expanded or until another election. The public justification would be that if the country is going back to the polls anyway, then the only question is whether that happens under a Netanyahu minority government or an Eisenkot minority government.
The main problem with this scenario is the prospective partners. Lieberman and Bennett have already made clear that they would refuse to join such a move. True, they said the same sort of thing in 2021 and then formed a coalition with Ra’am. But this time there is also a political self-interest involved. > >